On Supremacy, Part One: For All The Marbles

To the victor, spoiled.

Imperial Japanese Army occupation of Seoul, Korea

Part of why this one has taken so long is I’ve tried for a few weeks now to neatly consolidate a lot of ideas into a single discussion, but I don’t think it works here, so I think it’s best if I let it break itself up naturally and talk about the interrelated concepts I’ve been working on in whatever discrete chunks they want. In all, they’re about supremacy as a concept and how it connects to much of what we’re living through.

If I mention the name Henry Kissinger, a lot of people reading probably just cringed, hissed, or started unsubscribing. But I’ve learned a great deal from reading Kissinger over the years, most notably the most recent work I read about a year ago, World Order, which I highly recommend.

When I read Kissinger, I’m reminded of a math teacher I had in high school, who looked a lot like him, but was a little smaller and had more hair. He looked like a cross between Kissinger and Einstein. He had a pedagogy that makes me think of what people have described good yeshiva education to be: a neutral and nonpartisan presentation of information followed by a phase of vigorously critical thinking. He did a great job of never, ever letting anyone be sure what his own philosophy or politics were, but was ruthless in dismissing a student’s perspective if it wasn’t extremely well-argued.

One of the things Kissinger talks about a lot in World Order and, indeed, in any of his more stately tomes, is the Treaty of Westphalia as a sort of cornerstone to modern Western Civ, at least as far as the root of the West’s modern formulation of geopolitics. “Classical liberalism” as we talk about it today is always linked to the Enlightenment era, of which Westphalia is also a product.

I actually contend that classical liberalism has more to do with a Westphalian political model specifically than really anything else we like to hang on the Enlightenment in general, like the rise of scientific reasoning or the (relative) moderation of medieval Christianity.

The Treaty of Westphalia was a radical departure from European politics up to that point in that it represented a turn towards a “balance of power,” the idea that a unipolar world wasn’t desirable and was best kept in check- from any direction- by the ability of many, discrete elements of power (nation states) to organize against any one member seeking hegemony. For its time, this was wild stuff, even just accepting the idea that “might makes right” was no longer the fundamental arbiter of cassus belli.

But it was, also, an endorsement of pluralism. Yes, the nations of Enlightenment-era Europe were all Christian, many with common cultural elements, but this didn’t stop them from finding reasons to war with each other for centuries, often over ostensibly sectarian and cultural grievances.

Westphalia amounted to the idea that even if signatory states had their own impulses to totally dominate one or all of their neighbors, none of them wanted to be on the receiving end of such domination in the form of total war and conquest. The notion of enshrining national sovereignty came into its own, with an idea that anyone trying to disrupt the European order as it was flash-frozen at the moment of Westphalia was breaking the rules and would be piled on by everyone else. Even small, militarily weak states were (in theory) recognized as having equal right to exist with their borders as currently defined without being conquered.

Obviously Westphalia was more complex than all of this, in reality, so I don’t need a million explanations of how I’m not representing it accurately. I’m bringing up Westphalia only to illustrate the idea that around this time, the notion of total war- of the pursuit of complete conquest and annihilation of another entity- was considered, at least in theory, uncouth.

Sherman’s March To The Sea, 1868

When Gen. Sherman mobilized the Savannah campaign against the Confederacy, it was part of Grant’s overall strategy of “total war,” noteworthy because it was not how the Civil War had been waged up to that point, and noteworthy because- given the European philosophical tradition including Westphalian principles up to that point- it was not how war had been waged in the West for quite some time. As executed by Sherman, “total war” looked like this: all resources in enemy territory are to be looted, whether military or civilian; all targets are fair game, whether military or civilian, and all infrastructure and land not lootable should be destroyed as thoroughly as time and resources allowed, military or civilian, to deny the enemy their use. While this strategy is credited with bringing about Union victory (it remains debatable whether it was the only or even optimal way it might have been achieved), its consequences- including the political motivation to continue the policy as a guiding principle for occupying the southern states in the reconstruction period that followed- shattered the economic and social structure of the recaptured south- which was ostensibly now simply part of the United States again- for generations, with effects arguably felt well into the present era with divides that remain visible today.

But even Grant’s grand strategy wasn’t a true example of “total war” as it existed as the normal state of affairs for millennia of human history. For the majority of our existence, war meant:

• the conquered state’s government was dismantled, and if it was a hereditary monarchy like most in history, everyone in the royal line was killed (females were sometimes married into the conquering dynasty to create legitimacy, but this was a relatively recent innovation).

• everyone who wasn’t killed in the process of conquest was now a subject in full of the conquering state and was expected to adopt the new language, demonstrate fealty, and had no redress in terms of the confiscation of their lands, property, or family members (if they had any of these things in the first place).

• like Sherman, there was no such thing as a civilian; members of the losing state who did not or could not successfully resist were looted, killed, and raped if the mood struck the invading army. There was no redress for this sort of thing afterwards.

• It goes without saying that there were no limits on the treatment or dispensation of anyone captured or arrested during the course of conquest. Prisoners of war remained alive to be redeemed for ransom, enslaved, exchanged, or freed as part of a brokered peace, if they lived that long. How they were treated in the meantime was of no consequence to anyone.

• on some occasions, especially if the total war was between traditional ethic rivals with deep, longstanding grievance, the population in the defeated state wasn’t even kept around as subjects- they were hunted down and killed as thoroughly as possible, and generally your only hope of avoiding this was to flee to a neighboring state that would tolerate your presence.

It’s worth remembering that this was seen as normal and expected for the majority of war’s history- a nation doing these things wasn’t seen as exceptionally cruel or evil, soldiers that did these things in the course of warfare weren’t seen as exceptionally brutal or unprofessional, and often the “loser” would have been as likely to wage war in the same manner if the shoe had been on the other foot. For the majority of human history, this was just “how things were.”

Waging war (or whatever other legalism you want to use like “police actions” or “limited engagements”) as a means of accomplishing specific objectives and then intentionally stopping is very, very modern, and the sensibilities of Westphalia have a lot to do with that.

So, enough about medieval genocides and Westphalia and the American Civil War, what is this all a buildup to?

“Between two groups of people who want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds, I see no remedy but force.” - Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.

I learned the above quote many years ago and it has profoundly influenced the lens through which I’ve viewed human conflict- and make no mistake, even though the vast majority of us are not currently concerned by the behavior of invading armies or falling bombs, we are living through a period of immense conflict; this period has only just begun, and its duration and shape has largely yet to be determined.

Much of our current conflict (I’m using the singular here for convenience, even though we are experiencing the current period as a set of different or loosely-connected conflicts between both domestic and external forces) has been framed by at least one of the parties involved as a “war,” and much of this language is not subtle. The behavior of the opposition is framed as an existential threat- an all-or-nothing showdown between two groups of people who want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds- necessitating, at least in the rhetoric, a course framed as total war.

People who voted for this guy need to all be put in reeducation camps- not just the guy, or the people who gave him big money, but all of them. They cannot exist in their current state.

People who refuse to embrace this policy need to be completely disenfranchised or allowed/caused to die. We cannot pursue our agenda unless literally everyone is on board with it, ergo they are threatening all of us. They cannot continue to exist as social units in their current state.

People who espouse a certain ideology are existential threats- by their mere existence- to the continued existence of a given state or culture. They should be considered enemy combatants or terrorists and handled accordingly.

I want to be clear, because I don’t normally go in for both-sidesism: I’m wording these framings carefully because both sides of these disputes are factionalizing behind these same principles.

We want inconsistent worlds. We conceive of “correct” reality in irreconcilable ways. We rightly cannot budge, and they, thinking the same, cannot either. I see no remedy but force.

The problem with this line of thinking is that the foundations of our modern civilization are incompatible with the consequences of it.

No matter which side of the many polarized disputes you’re on, you do not live in a society that will continue to function the way you want it to if victory means essentially exterminating your opponents, salting their fields, and enslaving their children.

If you want to completely disarm a civilian population with tens of millions of guns that have enjoyed this right since the founding of your nation, you will have to kill a huge number of them to completely accomplish this.

If you want to completely ban the consumption of alcohol in a society that has enjoyed the right to drink since forever, you will create a massive black market led by incredibly violent criminal syndicates who will corrupt your leaders in the course of doing business.

If you want to completely ban abortion everywhere under all circumstances, people who are used to having the right to get one will find ways of doing so; a lot of them will get hurt or die in the process, you’ll fill your jails with people who get caught, and so on.

If you want to outlaw certain kinds of political speech (i.e., dissent), you’re going to have to progressively (see what I did there?) ratchet up the severity of punishment, will create a black market for free speech channels, and will eventually outrage people who are not your most fanatical affiliates. You’re going to have to build a lot more jails, build an even bigger surveillance apparatus against your own people, punish a lot of people that weren’t necessarily threats and accept creating a lot of enemies you wouldn’t have otherwise, and so on.

If you want to say that the existence of sexual minorities is completely illegitimate, that they are all mentally ill predators bent on destroying civilization and are basically pedophiles by another name, that small minority still adds up to a few million people that are not going to suddenly “snap out of it” and begin behaving like whatever passes for model citizens. You’ll need to put millions of people (including lots of people’s children) into involuntary institutionalization, take millions of them away from parents, and so on.

At least one of these examples probably pissed you off, and that’s fine (and intentional); but understand that because these conflicts have been framed as an existential war between opposing realities, the insinuation is that compromise of any kind simply doesn’t exist, or we’re way past it, and is a loser’s lunch anyway.

And I’m not even necessarily arguing that your feelings are invalid; but don’t lose sight of what it will take to fully wage total war against an opposing ideology. It’s not easy these days to imprison, enslave, or kill entire populations (not for want of trying). Supremacy is exhausting and expensive and diverts a lot of resources away from other things that are probably more important to our day-to-day lives. It takes a lot of work and willingness to do things you wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end of.

Again, there have been moments in history where societies have collectively decided that this is the only course of action, and have followed through with the total war of one ideology against another. But it was always costly, it was always painful for both sides, and can rarely be said to have created an optimal society in its aftermath.

Mass grave of executed political prisoners during Stalinist “Great Purge,” circa 1938.

Think about what victory in ideological conflict looks like, what it would take in practical terms to execute it, once your vanquished foes lay helpless at your feet, and if this process is in itself worthwhile.

Like my old math prof, I’m not going to try to say what the virtuous answer is. But I’m going to demand that you think your answer all the way through.

More on the modern concept of “supremacy” in the next piece in this series.